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In the present research, we investigated the effect of participants’ mood during encoding on 
true and false memory of an event using the misinformation paradigm. In addition, we also 
examined how the emotional content of the event interacted with participants’ mood during 
encoding to influence memory for that event. To do this, participants were randomly assigned 
to one of three induced-mood groups (positive, negative, or neutral) and were presented with 
a video recording of an event. Participants returned 24-hrs later, and were randomly assigned 
to one of three question groups (misleading, leading, or neutral). We found that false memory 
was higher for information pertaining to the negative scenes of the event than for information 
pertaining to the positive or neutral scenes of the event. Contrary to our hypothesis, we found 
that mood during encoding did not influence true or false memory of the event. These 
findings have important practical implications in the context of the courtroom where to-be-
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Many of us would not be surprised to learn that memory is not perfect, and at times can be 
far from it. When we retain memories of past events, they are never exact reproductions of those 
original experiences.  Instead, remembering is a process of reconstruction that is highly 
susceptible to distortion. False memory refers to situations in which individuals recollect events 
that they did not experience (for a review, see Frenda, Nichols, & Loftus, 2011). These false 
memories can range from omission errors regarding small details, to the development of 
completely false memories for events that never occurred. Over the past four decades, there has 
been a surge in research on false memory (Bernstein, Scoboria, Desjarlais, & Soucie, 2018). This 
high level of research interest is driven, in part, by the high stakes involved when memory goes 
wrong. In the case of a courtroom or in the context of psychotherapy, for example, the 
consequences of false memories can be dire. Memories in these particular situations are also 
often emotionally-laden in both their content and their context.  Thus, one important line of 
research has been to explore the effect of emotion on false memories.  
Given that eyewitnesses may be in a particular mood when they witness an event, and 
when they encounter additional information about that event, it is important to understand how an 
individual’s mood during each phase of the eyewitness process may influence their recall of both 
true and false details of the event. To the best of our knowledge, there have been no studies in 
which researchers have investigated how an individual’s mood during the encoding stage (when 
the event was originally witnessed) affects their susceptibility to false memory. In addition, it is 
unclear how mood and emotional content might interact to influence true and false memory of an 
event. Therefore, the goal of the present experiment was to investigate how the emotional content 
of information and the mood of the individual at the time of encoding influence the development 
of false memory. 
To understand how emotion influences false memory, it is important to consider how 
emotion influences memory in general. The emotional nature of an event can be parsed into two 
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factors ─ valence and arousal. Valence refers to how positive or negative the event is 
(Colombetti, 2005). Arousal, on the other hand, refers to the degree of activation elicited by the 
event (Posner, Russell, & Peterson, 2005). In general, researchers have shown that emotionally-
arousing events or stimuli are more likely to be remembered than are non-arousing neutral 
events or stimuli. This emotional memory enhancement has been demonstrated across a range of 
studies, with a range of stimuli (e.g., Brewer, 1988; Burke, Heuer, & Reisberg, 1992; Cahill & 
McGaugh, 1995; Kensinger & Corkin, 2003). In one study by Cahill and McGaugh (1995), for 
example, two groups of participants viewed an identical slideshow. For one group, the slides 
were accompanied by a neutral narrative. For the second group, the slides were accompanied by 
an emotionally-arousing narrative. Participants who heard the emotionally-arousing narrative 
exhibited enhanced recall of the narrative and also recalled more slides than did participants who 
heard the neutral narrative.   
Researchers have also shown that emotionally-valenced events or stimuli are more likely 
to be remembered than are non-emotionally-valenced neutral events or stimuli. For example, in 
studies of autobiographical memory, researchers have shown that people vividly recall events that 
are emotionally-valanced (e.g., an accident), compared to non-emotionally-valenced neutral 
events (e.g., a worker outside a garage, Brewer, 1988). Similarly, in studies conducted under 
more controlled laboratory conditions, researchers have also demonstrated that recall rates are 
higher for positive and negative stimuli than for neutral stimuli (for review, see Buchanan & 
Adolphs, 2002). 
Although events with negative and positive valence (e.g., a funeral or a wedding) are 
more likely to be remembered than are neutral events, negative and positive valence have 
different effects on remembering particular details of the event (e.g., what the church looked like; 
Kensinger, 2009). For example, the visual detail of negative items is more likely to be 
remembered than is the visual detail of positive items (see Kensinger, Garoff-Eaton, & Schacter, 
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2007).  Furthermore, although participants are able to distinguish between what they saw and 
what they imagined when it comes to negative items, they tend to confuse imagined information 
with perceived information when it comes to positive items (see Kensinger, O’Brien, Swanberg, 
Garoff-Eaton, & Schacter, 2007). Moreover, positive emotion is often associated with lower 
memory accuracy. For example, Bohn and Berntsen (2007) compared Germans’ memories for 
the fall of the Berlin Wall as a function of whether they considered the event to be highly positive 
or highly negative. Participants in the positive group rated their memories higher on measures of 
reliving and sensory imagery compared to participants in the negative group. Despite this 
difference in rating, the positive group’s actual memory for the facts was less accurate than that 
of participants in the negative group.  
A number of researchers have also explored the impact of emotional valence by looking 
at participants’ recall of central or intrinsic features versus peripheral or extrinsic features of an 
event (Mather & Sutherland, 2009; Touryan, Marian, & Shimamura, 2007; Waring & Kensinger, 
2011), noting that what is considered a central or intrinsic feature is often specific to an 
individual.  In one study by Christianson and Loftus (1991), for example, participants viewed 
either a slideshow with emotional content, or a neutral slideshow. Participants in the emotional 
slideshow condition remembered more details about central items (e.g., presence of a woman, 
colour of her coat) than did participants in the neutral condition. However, despite their superior 
memory for the central details, participants in the emotional slideshow condition were also less 
likely to remember peripheral details (e.g., colour of a car in the background of the scene) 
compared to participants in the neutral condition. Similarly, Rimmele, Davachi, Petrov, Dougal, 
and Phelps (2011) had participants view negative and neutral scenes and then used the 
remember/know paradigm to investigate whether the subjective sense of recollection for negative 
stimuli was coupled with accurate memory. They found that “remember” judgements were more 
likely for negative scenes relative to neutral scenes. At the same time, memory for contextual 
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details (e.g., colour of the frame of the scene) was poorer for negative compared to neutral scenes 
that were given a “remember” response. Overall, there are complicated effects of emotion on 
memory, but in general, negative items are more likely to be remembered than are positive items. 
Furthermore, central or intrinsic details are more likely to be remembered than are peripheral or 
contextual details.  
There are currently a range of theories proposed by memory researchers to account for 
findings on the relation between emotion and memory. Kensinger (2009) argues that it is the 
arousal aspect of emotion that results in the memory enhancement of an emotional event, but that 
the valence aspect of emotion is important for determining which aspects of an experience will be 
remembered. In particular, Kensinger proposes that negative valence leads people to focus their 
attention on sensory processing and detailed information (e.g., a black and grey bird with blue 
eyes). In contrast, positive valence leads people to focus their attention more broadly on semantic 
or conceptual processing of the gist of the information (e.g., a bird). In other words, attentional 
narrowing with negative information may result in more accurate memory for negative 
information compared to positive information. The term attentional narrowing is used to refer to 
the fact that emotion restricts the focus of attention by drawing attention to emotionally-related 
central information, leaving fewer resources for processing peripheral information. A well-known 
example of attentional narrowing is the weapon focus effect, whereby an individual narrows their 
attention to focus on emotionally-charged information ─ the weapon ─ resulting in reduced 
ability to remember other peripheral details of the crime, such as details of the perpetrator’s face 
(Loftus, Loftus, & Messo, 1987).  
In contrast to Kensinger (2009), Mathers and Sutherland (2009) have proposed that it is 
the arousal component of emotion that leads to enhanced memory for central or intrinsic features 
of emotional items, rather than the valence of the item. In support of this proposition, Mather and 
Nesmith (2008) presented participants with 72 picture pairs; each pair of pictures was similar in 
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appearance (i.e., valence), but differed in arousal. Later, they assessed the participants’ memory 
of the intrinsic and extrinsic details of the pictures. They found that the participants exhibited 
enhanced memory for the intrinsic details of arousing objects, compared to the intrinsic details 
for non-arousing stimuli, regardless of the valence of the pictures. Mather and Nesmith’s study 
provides evidence that it may be arousal, and not valence that is essential for enhanced memory 
for intrinsic details of emotional objects.  
 Taken together, research on the relation between emotion and memory suggests that 
emotionally-arousing events are normally remembered better than are non-emotionally-arousing 
events. Moreover, both arousal and valence may play a role in memory accuracy. More 
specifically, on the one hand, people exhibit greater memory for the details of arousing stimuli, 
while on the other hand, people exhibit greater memory for negative stimuli. So far, we have no 
idea which one, arousal or valence, has a greater effect on memory accuracy. The simple 
conclusion that we can draw from prior research is that emotional arousal or valence must be 
controlled when the goal of the study is to investigate the effect of emotional valence or arousal 
per se.      
Mood  
In addition to the emotional characteristics of the event, an individual’s mood at the time 
of the event may also influence his or her memory of it. Mood refers to a temporary state of mind 
or feeling (Chaplin, John, & Goldberg, 1988); it can be considered to be an aspect of the context 
in which events are encoded or retrieved. Although our moods may, or may not, match the 
emotional content of an event (Ellis & Moore, 1999), researchers have demonstrated that mood 
can influence the encoding and retrieval of non-emotive materials (Ellis, Varner, Becker, & 
Ottaway, 1995; Gärtner & Bajbouj, 2014; Lee & Sternthal, 1999; Roos & Gow, 2007; Thorley, 
Dewhurst, Abel, & Knott, 2016).  
In one study, for example, Lee and Sternthal (1999) randomly assigned participants to a 
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neutral or positive mood condition. Participants watched a series of advertisements and were then 
shown a list of 25 brand names via a slide projector, and asked to indicate if they recognised any 
of the brand names. After engaging in a 10-min distracter task, participants completed a task to 
assess their memory for the 25 target brands. Moods were induced before the memory task, 
potentially influencing the encoding of to-be-remembered materials. Lee and Sternthal found that 
participants who were in a positive mood exhibited enhanced memory of brand names, compared 
to participants in a neutral mood.  
Although Lee and Sternthal (1999) compared the effect of positive and neutral moods on 
memory, they did not explore the effect of negative moods on memory. Other researchers, 
however, have shown that in contrast to the effect of positive moods, negative moods at the time 
of retrieval may decrease memory performance (Roos & Gow, 2007). In Roos and Gow’s study, 
they asked participants to read a non-emotive story and then recall it while in a neutral mood. 
One week later, participants were induced into either a negative mood or a neutral mood and 
asked to provide a free-recall account of the story again. Mood was induced after the memory 
task so that here, mood influenced the retrieval of to-be-remembered materials. Roos and Gow 
found that, on the second free-recall attempt, participants in a negative mood recalled less 
compared to participants in a neutral mood.  
Direct comparison between the studies conducted by Lee and Sternthal (1999) and Roos 
and Gow (2007) is not possible because Lee and Sternthal investigated the effect of positive 
moods on encoding of stimuli whereas Roos and Gow investigated the effect of negative moods 
on retrieval of stimuli. The simple conclusion that we can draw from the literature is that positive 
and negative moods have different impacts on processing information which is consistent with 
the affect-as-information hypothesis. According to the affect-as-information hypothesis, positive 
moods promote a heuristic processing mode, whereas negative moods promote an item-specific 
processing mode (Clore, Gasper, & Garvin, 2001). 
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A person’s mood and the emotional valence of an event are often considered in isolation. 
However, a person is very rarely in a neutral mood when they experience an event, or are asked 
to recall an emotive event. When the emotional content of an event matches a person’s mood, it 
can create an effect called mood-congruent memory. Mood-congruent memory refers to enhanced 
recall of emotional information that is consistent with a person’s current mood state (Bower, 
1981). For example, if a person is in a sad mood, he or she is more likely to recall negative past 
events compared to non-negative past events (Bower, 1981).  
Researchers have consistently demonstrated mood-congruent memory effects in studies of 
depressed patients. That is, depressed patients typically have better memory for negatively-
valenced events compared to non-depressed individuals (Leppänen, 2006; Rinck & Becker, 2005; 
Wittekind et al., 2014). For example, Wittekind et al. (2014) compared the performance of 
patients with major depressive disorder to the performance of a group of healthy controls on a 
recognition task. Participants were presented with a series of word pairs in a learning trial. After 
performing a distractor task, participants were asked to identify which of the words had been 
presented previously, and which ones were novel. Wittekind et al. found that when the novel 
words were negative, the depressed patients rated more of the novel words as old than did the 
healthy controls. Although mood-congruent memory has been studied extensively in depressed 
populations, it has been studied less often in non-clinical populations.  
A phenomenon related to mood-congruent memory is mood-dependent memory. Mood-
dependent memory refers to the fact that people are better able to recall information if they are 
currently in the same mood that they were in at the time that they originally encoded the 
information (Bower, 1981). This effect occurs regardless of the emotional valence of the 
information. For example, if a person is currently sad, they are better able to recall information 
from other times when they were sad (Bower, 1981). This mood-dependent memory effect has 
been demonstrated across a range of studies (Bower, Monteiro, & Gilligan, 1978; Thorley et al., 
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2016; Weingartner, Miller, & Murphy, 1977). For example, Thorley et al. (2016) had participants 
watch one of two videos to induce them into a negative or a neutral mood. Participants then 
watched a video of a neutral event, and following a delay, some of the participants were induced 
into a negative mood before their memory of the event was assessed. Thorley et al. found that a 
negative mood at both encoding and recall enhanced the number of correct details that 
participants recalled compared to when participants were in a different mood at both encoding 
and recall, demonstrating a mood-dependent memory effect.  
Bower (1981) argues that mood-congruent memory and mood-dependent memory can be 
explained by the network theory of affect. Bower proposes that emotional memory is represented 
by emotional nodes. These emotional nodes can become activated by many stimuli. The 
activation of an emotion node spreads throughout the memory structures to which it is connected. 
This activation of the memory structure makes the relevant information more accessible to 
conscious retrieval.  
Taken together, prior research suggests that mood influences memory for emotive and 
non-emotive events. Specifically, a negative mood impairs memory of non-emotive information, 
while a positive mood enhances memory of non-emotive information. When considering mood 
and emotive events together, the mood-congruent memory effect facilitates enhanced recall of 
emotional information that is consistent with a person’s current mood state. Additionally, the 
mood-dependent memory effect facilitates enhanced recall of information that was learned when 
the person was in a similar mood. Having reviewed research on the influence of emotional 
content and mood on memory in general, next I will focus on how emotion affects false memory, 
in particular.  
False Memory  
Memory is a process of reconstruction that is susceptible to distortion (for a review, see 
Frenda et al., 2011). During the process of reconstruction, false memories can emerge when an 
 9 
individual recalls events or parts of events that they did not experience. In some situations, false 
memories are benign. For example, there is little consequence to recalling that your sister’s car is 
red instead of blue, but when false memories occur in the course of courtroom testimony or 
eyewitness identification, their consequences can be dire. Memories in these situations are often 
emotionally-laden in both their content and their context. Given this, it is important to investigate 
how emotional content and mood may influence the development of false memory. To do this, 
we first need to consider the experimental methods that have been used to study false memories, 
and consider the processes that are thought to be responsible for their development. Then, in the 
next section, we will consider the impact of emotional content and mood on false memories.  
Researchers have developed a number of memory distortion paradigms over the past 
several decades. The Deese-Roediger-Mc-Dermott (DRM) (Deese, 1959; Roediger & 
McDermott, 1995) paradigm and the misinformation paradigm (Loftus, 1975) are the most 
common procedures used for studying false memory (for a review, see Brainerd & Reyna, 2005). 
The DRM paradigm involves presenting participants with a list of words (e.g., bed, rest, and 
pillow) that are associated with a critical “lure” word (e.g., sleep), which is not included on the 
list. When participants are subsequently asked to recall the words on the list, they are highly 
likely to exhibit false recall and false recognition of lure words; in fact, their recall and 
recognition of the lures (false recall or recognition) is often equivalent to that of list words (for a 
review, see Gallo, 2013).  
Two main theories have been proposed to explain false memories in the DRM paradigm – 
Fuzzy Trace Theory (FTT) and Spreading Activation Theory (SAT). According to FTT, there are 
two qualitatively-different representations in memory – gist representations and verbatim 
representations (Brainerd & Reyna, 2005). Gist representations focus on the general semantic 
meaning of information (e.g., critical lures in the DRM paradigm). In contrast, verbatim 
representations focus on specificity of information (e.g. the position, pronunciation, and word 
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length of each list word). According to FTT, false memory of critical lures in the DRM paradigm 
is due to gist representations of list words because critical lures essentially share the semantic 
meaning of the words that appear on the list (Brainerd & Reyna, 2005). Alternatively, according 
to SAT, multiple, interlinked concepts are stored in one’s knowledge base (Roediger, Balota, & 
Watson, 2001). The more related the two concepts, the closer the link. According to SAT, 
activation of one concept leads to activation of all of the related concepts and therefore, false 
memories emerge because activation of list words results in an automatic spreading of activation 
to semantically-related words, including the critical lure. The activation of the critical lure results 
in participants falsely recalling that it was presented in the word list (Roediger, Balota, & 
Watson, 2001).  
The misinformation paradigm is another procedure commonly used to study false 
memory. The misinformation paradigm was pioneered by Loftus (1975); typically it involves 
three phases. First, participants witness an event. Second, the participants are exposed to either 
misleading information about the event, or non-misleading information about the event. In the 
final phase, participants’ memory of the original event is assessed. Researchers have 
demonstrated that people frequently remember the misleading information as being part of the 
original event; this outcome is referred to as the “misinformation effect” (for a review, see 
Pickrell, McDonald, Bernstein, & Loftus, 2016).  
The most widely supported explanation for the effect of misinformation in the 
development of false memories is based on a source-monitoring framework (Johnson, Hashtoud, 
& Lindsay, 1993). According to this framework, the misinformation effect is due to source 
monitoring errors; people wrongfully attribute the misinformation that is provided externally to 
their own memory of the original information that is generated internally. It is this misattribution 
that results in the creation of false memories in the misinformation paradigm (e.g., Loftus, 2003; 
MacLeod & Saunders, 2008; Okado & Stark, 2005; Otgaar & Candel, 2011; Otgaar, Howe, 
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Peters, Sauerland, & Raymaekers, 2013; Stark, Okado, & Loftus, 2010; Zhu, Chen, Loftus, Lin, 
& Dong, 2013). 
In sum, false memory created by the DRM paradigm is spontaneous; people elicit DRM 
false memories themselves. In contrast, false memory created by the misinformation paradigm is 
not spontaneous; it results from suggestive information provided by an external source. The 
relation between the two kinds of false memories produced by these paradigms has been a topic 
of considerable debate (Calvillo & Parong, 2016; Patihis, Frenda, & Loftus, 2018). Although the 
topic is important in terms of the generalisability of the results from lab research to real life 
memories, it is beyond the focus of the present research. To obtain an overall picture of how 
emotional content and moods influence false memory, next I will consider studies that have been 
conducted with the DRM paradigm, followed by studies that have been conducted with the 
misinformation paradigm.   
DRM studies. In the literature, there are three lines of research investigating the effect of 
emotional content and mood on false memory in the DRM paradigm. First, researchers have 
investigated the effect of emotionally-laden word lists on false memory in the absence of mood 
induction. In general, in the majority of these studies, researchers have consistently found false 
memories to be the most frequent for negative lure words compared to neutral or positive lure 
words (Brainerd, Holliday, Reyna, Yang, & Toglia, 2010; Brainerd, Stein, Silveira, Rohenkohl, 
& Reyna, 2008; Palmer & Dodson, 2009). 
Second, researchers have investigated the effect of induced mood states on false memory 
of non-emotive word lists. In general, these findings suggest that individuals in a positive mood 
are more likely to falsely recall critical lures, whereas individuals in a negative mood are less 
likely to falsely recall critical lures (Storbeck, 2013; Storbeck & Clore, 2005, 2011). For 
example, Storbeck and Clore (2005) induced participants into a positive or negative mood, and 
then participated in the DRM paradigm where they were only exposed to neutral word lists. 
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Storbeck and Clore found that participants who were in a positive mood falsely recalled the 
critical lures more often than did participants who were in a negative mood.  
In line with the affect-as-information hypothesis, positive moods are assumed to promote 
feelings of efficacy which promote default relational processing. In contrast, negative moods are 
assumed to promote feelings of inefficacy which inhibit the individual from using default 
relational processing; instead, the individual uses item-specific processing (Schwarz & Clore, 
1983; Storbeck, 2013). Relational processing resembles gist processing in FTT, while item-
specific processing resembles verbatim processing in FTT. Moreover, according to FTT, gist 
processing promotes false memory whereas verbatim processing inhibits false memory. 
Therefore, positive moods—which promote gist processing—should increase false memory. In 
contrast, negative moods—which promote verbatim processing—should decrease false memory 
(Storbeck & Clore, 2005, 2011).  
In sum, there are different effects of emotional content (i.e., emotional DRM word lists) 
and emotional state/context (i.e., mood) on false memory. More specifically, research on 
emotional word lists and false memory suggests that negative lists promote the generation of 
more false memories compared to neutral and positive lists. Research on mood and false 
memory, on the other hand, suggests that negative moods reduce false memories, while positive 
moods increase false memories. This begs the question, what happens to the rate of false 
memories when we manipulate both the emotional content of the word lists and the participant’s 
mood?  
One way that researchers have investigated the effect of emotional content and 
participants’ mood on false memory is by administering emotional DRM word lists to patients 
with depression—a naturally-occurring mood manipulation. The findings of these studies suggest 
that patients with depression have higher false memory for negative word lists, compared to 
positive or neutral word lists (Howe & Malone, 2011; Joormann, Teachman, & Gotlib, 2009; 
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Moritz, Gläscher, & Brassen, 2005). For example, Howe and Malone (2011) investigated false 
memory in individuals with and without a diagnosis of major depressive disorder (MDD). 
Participants were presented with neutral, negative, and depression-relevant word lists, and their 
recall of the word lists was assessed. Howe and Malone found that participants with MDD falsely 
recognised significantly more depression-relevant words than did non-depressed controls.   
In another line of research, researchers have investigated the effect of emotional content 
and mood on false memory in non-clinical populations. Ruci, Tomes, and Zelenski (2009), for 
example, induced participants into a happy, sad, or neutral mood and participants were then 
presented with positive, negative, and neutral DRM word lists. Participants were asked to recall 
the word lists, as well as make “remember/know” judgements. Ruci et al. found that when 
participants were induced in a negative mood, they had more false memories for negative lists 
than for positive or neutral lists. In contrast, when participants were induced in a positive mood, 
they had more false memories for positive lists compared to negative or neutral lists. In other 
words, when the valence of the critical lures matched the mood-induction condition, false 
memory rates increased, showing a mood-congruent false memory effect. Knott and Thorley 
(2014) used the same procedure as Ruci et al. except that they administered both immediate and 
delayed recognition tests. Knott and Thorley found a negative mood-congruent false memory 
effect when participants were asked to make remember judgments for critical lures, on both 
immediate and delayed testing. However, they did not find this mood-congruent false memory 
effect for general recognition.  
One common issue in Ruci et al. (2009) and Knott and Thorley (2014) is that not every 
word on a particular list reflected the target emotion. To solve this problem, in a first experiment, 
Zhang, Gross, and Hayne (2017a) initially compiled emotional word lists where every word on a 
particular list reflected the target emotion. In a second experiment, they induced participants into 
a positive, neutral, or negative mood and then participants were presented with a series of 
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positive, neutral, or negative word lists. Zhang et al. found that the false memory of participants 
in the positive or neutral mood condition did not vary as a function of the emotional valence of 
the words on the list. However, when participants were in a negative mood, there was a decrease 
in false recognition of the positive and neutral lures. This finding is in accordance with other 
studies indicating a negative mood-congruent effect on false memory.  
Zhang et al. (2017a) used FTT and SAT to propose two alternative explanations for their 
findings. According to FTT, negative moods may selectively promote gist representation of 
negative information which leads to increased false memory of negative words when participants 
are in a negative mood. According to SAT, on the other hand, when participants are in a negative 
mood, semantic activation may spread primarily to information that is congruent with the 
participant’s mood (i.e., negative information). Alternatively, when participants are in a positive 
or neutral mood, semantic activation spreads more widely to information that is more weakly 
associated (i.e., positive or neutral information). 
Misinformation studies. In addition to the DRM paradigm, researchers have also used 
the misinformation paradigm to investigate the effect of emotional content on an individual’s 
susceptibility to false memory. For example, Porter, Spencer, and Birt (2003) had participants 
view images of a highly-positive, neutral, or highly-negative scene. Half of the participants were 
then exposed to misleading questions concerning the scene, one of the questions included a major 
false suggestion (e.g., an animal that was not present at the scene). An hour later, all of the 
participants were asked for a free-recall account of the scene, and were then asked 10 direct 
questions about it. Porter et al. found that misleading questions impaired recall accuracy by 37%. 
Furthermore, negative images were associated with a greater susceptibility to false memories, 
compared to positive or neutral images. In a follow-up study, Porter, Bellhouse, McDougall, ten 
Brinke, and Wilson (2010) investigated if a longer delay would influence participants’ 
susceptibility to misinformation. Participants viewed an image of either a highly-positive, or 
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highly-negative scene. Half of the participants were then exposed to misleading questions 
concerning the scene. After a 1-week or a 1-month delay, participants returned to the laboratory 
and were asked questions about the images. Porter et al. (2010) found that negative images were 
associated with a greater susceptibility to false memories, compared to positive images. 
Furthermore, this effect persisted even after a 1-month delay.  
In another study, Van Damme and Smets (2014) attempted to disentangle the influences 
of valence and arousal on false memory. In their study, participants were shown six types of 
images (positive valance with high/low arousal, negative valance with high/low arousal, 
ambiguous, and neutral). Half of the participants were then exposed to misinformation (e.g., set 
in italics here: “Did you see the white t-shirt the man was wearing underneath his striped shirt?); 
control participants received no misinformation. After a 35-min delay, Van Damme and Smets 
assessed participants’ memory of the central and peripheral aspects of the images. They found 
that negative and ambiguous images elicited fewer correct and more false memories for 
peripheral details, compared to positive and neutral images, regardless of previous exposure to 
misinformation. In addition, arousal improved memory for central details. However, both 
negative valence and arousal inhibited control participants’ tendency to endorse false central 
details. Taken together, findings obtained using the misinformation paradigm are similar to those 
obtained in the DRM paradigm. Specifically, negative-valenced content tends to increase 
susceptibility to false memory, relative to positive- and neutral-valenced content.  
Studies in which researchers have investigated the effect of an individual’s mood on 
susceptibility to false memory have been conducted predominantly using the DRM paradigm. 
However, in a handful of studies, researchers have used the misinformation paradigm to study the 
same phenomenon. For example, Van Damme and Seynaeve (2013) had participants watch a 
video of a tradesman snooping around an unoccupied home before they were induced into one of 
six moods: positive mood with low/high arousal (serene/happy), negative mood with low/high 
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arousal (sad/angry), neutral mood, or a control condition. Participants were then exposed to 
misleading information by means of a narrative. Following this procedure, participants’ memory 
was tested with a recognition task, including confidence judgements. Van Damme and Seynaeve 
found that participants’ susceptibility to misinformation did not differ based on their mood. 
However, mood did significantly influence participants’ belief in their false memories. In 
particular, participants in a negative mood were more confident in all of their responses than were 
participants in a positive mood.  
In another study, Forgas, Laham, and Vargas (2005) investigated the influence of 
individuals’ mood on their susceptibility to false memory, as well as how this susceptibility might 
vary across the emotional content of an event. To do this, Forgas et al. conducted a series of 
experiments. In the first experiment, the participants viewed a positive image (wedding party 
scene) and a negative image (complex car crash scene). After a 45-min delay, participants were 
then induced into a positive, neutral, or a negative mood. Next, participants completed a short 
questionnaire about the images they saw earlier. The questionnaires contained either non-
misleading questions (e.g., ‘Did you see the overturned car on the roadside?’) or misleading 
questions (e.g., set in italics here: ‘Did you see the overturned car next to the broken guard 
rail?’). After another 45-min delay, participants’ memory of the images was assessed. Forgas et 
al. found that positive mood increased, and negative mood decreased, false memory of the 
images. This effect occurred for both negative and positive images.  
In a second experiment, Forgas et al. (2005) demonstrated that the effect that they found 
in their first experiment also occurred for real-life incidents. In Experiment 2, students in a 
lecture theatre witnessed an unexpected 5-min aggressive encounter between a lecturer and a 
female intruder. After a 1-week delay, participants were induced into a positive, neutral, or a 
negative mood. Next, participants completed a short questionnaire about the event that they had 
seen a week earlier. Half of the participants received a non-misleading form of each question 
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(e.g., ‘Did you see the lecturer removing his microphone as the woman approached?) and half 
received a misleading form (e.g., set in italics here: ‘Did you see the lecturer removing his 
microphone, as the woman wearing a light jacket moved towards him?’). After a 45-min delay, 
participants’ memory of the event was assessed and they were asked to rate their confidence in 
their recollections. Forgas et al. found that positive mood increased, and negative mood 
decreased, false memory of the event. In addition, participants in a positive mood were more 
likely to report the misleading details as true. It should be noted that in these two experiments, 
participant mood was induced after witnessing the event, but prior to the misleading information. 
In other words, the mood effect that Forgas et al. found may only reflect the effect of mood on 
encoding of the misleading information, in particular. 
Overall, findings from the misinformation paradigm are similar to those of the DRM 
paradigm. That is, negatively-valenced content tends to increase susceptibility to false memory, 
relative to positively- and neutrally-valenced content. In comparison, there are very few studies 
that have used the misinformation paradigm to assess the influence of mood on false memory. In 
general, the findings of the studies that have been published to date suggest that a positive mood 
during the post-event stage (when potentially misleading information is encountered) increases an 
individual’s susceptibility to false memory, whereas, a negative mood during the post-event stage 
decreases an individual’s susceptibility to false memory. 
What happens if mood is manipulated prior to the event? In real life, after all, victims or 
witnesses normally experience or encode an event in a particular mood (typically a negative 
mood). To the best of our knowledge, there have been no empirical studies exploring how an 
individual’s mood during the encoding stage (i.e., when the event is initially witnessed) affects 
their susceptibility to false memory. In addition, it is unclear how mood and emotional content 
might interact to influence true and false memory of an event. Given that eyewitnesses may be in 
a certain mood when they witness an event, an experience which is likely to be emotionally 
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charged, it is important to understand how an individual’s mood during the encoding of the 
emotional scenarios of an event would influence their memories.  
The Current Study  
In light of the importance of emotional content and mood on the accuracy of an 
individual’s memory of an event, the aim of the present research is to examine the effect of mood 
during encoding of an event that contains scenes differing in emotional valence, on true and false 
memory of that event using the misinformation paradigm. In addition, we will also examine how 
the emotional content of the event might interact with participants’ mood during encoding 
influence both true and false memory for that event. To do this, participants will watch a video of 
an event, and after a delay, they will be asked a series of post-event information questions about 
it. Participants will be induced into a positive, negative, or neutral mood prior to viewing the 
video.  
On the basis of prior research (e.g., Forgas et al., 2005; Zhang et al., 2017a), we 
hypothesise that false memory will be higher for information pertaining to negative scenes of the 
event than for information pertaining to positive or neutral scenes of the event. Given that no one 
has investigated the effect of mood during encoding on false memory in the misinformation 
paradigm, we were not able to propose a specific hypothesis in this regard. Rather, we attempted 
to predict the effect that mood during encoding would have on true and false memories for event 
scenes based on what we know about the affect-as-information hypothesis, SAT, and FTT. As 
shown in Table 1, we predicted that positive moods will increase true memories for the 
information that is presented in both positive and non-positive scenes because positive moods 
facilitate heuristic processing (as suggested by affect-as-information hypothesis). According to 
SAT, on the one hand, this increase in true memories may lead to more false memories as well. 
On the other hand, according to FTT, the increase in true memories may also lead to less false 
memory. We also predicted that negative moods, which are characterised by the item-specific 
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processing mode (also suggested by affect-as-information hypothesis), will increase true 
memories for the information that is presented in negative scenes particularly compared to that in 
positive or neutral scenes. According to SAT, this increase may increase false memory for the 
unpresented-but-related information that pertains to negative scenes. Alternatively, according to 
FTT, the increase of true memory for the presented information pertaining to negative scenes 
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There were a number of steps that we needed to take before we could conduct the 
main experiment. First, we needed to determine whether our proposed event video, Little Girl 
Lost, contained scenes that differed in emotional valence (Pilot Study 1); and second, we 
needed to determine the mood induction method that would be used in the main experiment 
(Pilot Study 2). 
Pilot Study 1: Determining the Emotional Valence of Scenes in Event Video 
The aim of Pilot Study 1 was to determine whether an event video called “Little Girl 
Lost” would be suitable for use in the main experiment. What we required was an event that 
contained a mixture of positive, negative, and neutral scenes, which differed in emotional 
valence. 
Method 
First, three experimenters independently watched a 5-min video called “Little Girl 
Lost.” In the video, a young girl (Sally) becomes separated from her mother during a trip to 
the dairy. Sally notices a dog, and follows it into a public botanical garden. In the garden, she 
drops her teddy and becomes lost. Sally comes across a road and is asked by a man in a car if 
she would like to come with him. Sally declines. The man then notices a police officer and 
drives off. The police officer approaches Sally and asks her several questions (i.e., what her 
name is, what her mum’s name is, what her mum’s cell phone number is, and where her mum 
works). The police officer then takes Sally to the police station and attempts to phone her 
mother. The scene then changes back to the garden to show two adolescents finding the girl’s 
soft toy. The children fight over the toy, resulting in its arm being ripped. They then throw 
the toy in a rubbish bin. After this, Sally’s mum is reunited with Sally at the police station. 
The experimenters were asked to break the video into scenes that differed in emotional 
valence; after discussion, they came up with nine scenes in total.  
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Next, we recruited 20 undergraduate students (16 females,  M age = 19.30 years, SD = 
0.67, range = 18-20 years) from the Department of Psychology’s Experimental Participation 
Pool to watch separate clips of the nine scenes, and to assess the emotional valence of each 
scene using an adapted version of Bradley and Lang's (1999) Self-Assessment Manikin 
(SAM). This graphic scale represents different emotional dimensions on a 9-point scale 
ranging from a happy, smiling figure (1) to an unhappy, frowning figure (9) (see Appendix 
A). Participants satisfied a small portion of course assessment by completing a worksheet 
based on the experiment and provided informed consent prior to their participation. 
Results  
Table 2 shows participants’ mean valence scores for each scene in the video. A one-
way repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) across valence scores showed that 
there was an effect of scene, F(8, 152) = 57.53, p < .001. A series of pairwise comparisons 
showed that participants’ valence scores fell into 3 distinct groups: scene 1 was rated as 





Table 2  
Mean valence score (SE) for each event scene and its corresponding valence 
Scene Valence Score Valence 
1 4.65 (0.34) Neutral 
2 6.40 (0.29) Negative 
3 6.50 (0.24) Negative 
4 6.30 (0.26) Negative 
5 7.70 (0.22) Negative 
6 3.25 (0.36) Positive 
7 2.95 (0.28) Positive 
8 6.35 (0.23) Negative 
9 2.20 (0.27) Positive 
 
We also assessed the reliability of the valence scores given by participants for the 
nine scenes. Interrater reliability was excellent; the intraclass correlation coefficient was .98, 
p < .05. Based on the results of Pilot Study 1, we concluded that the Little Girl Lost video 
met our requirement of containing a mixture of positive, negative, and neutral scenes and so 
was suitable to use in the main experiment.  
Pilot Study 2: Determining Mood Induction Method 
The goal of Pilot Study 2 was to determine the mood induction method that would be 
used in the main experiment. In previous research, Zhang et al. (2017a, b) have successfully 
induced positive, neutral, and negative moods using either music (Zhang et al., 2017a) or 
emotional video clips (Zhang et al., 2017b). Although inducing mood via video clips was our 
preferred method of mood induction because it can be used with children and adults, we 
wanted to test whether showing two videos in a row—a mood induction video followed by 
the event video (Little Girl Lost)—would interfere with participants’ recall of the event. 
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Method 
Participants. Ten undergraduate students (9 females, M age = 19.40 years, SD = 1.42, 
range = 18-22 years) were recruited from the Department of Psychology’s Experimental 
Participation Pool. They had not participated in Pilot Study 1. Participants satisfied a small 
portion of course assessment by completing a worksheet based on the experiment. 
Participants provided informed consent prior to their participation.  
Procedure. Participants came into the research laboratory individually and were 
randomly assigned to a music mood-induction group or to a video mood-induction group. 
Participants in the music mood-induction group listened to 8 mins of Prokofiev's Alexander 
Nevsky: Russia Under the Mongolian Yoke—the same piece of music used by Zhang et al. 
(2017a) to induce a negative mood—and were asked to generate thoughts that were 
consistent with the music. During the imagery phase, participants were also allowed to write 
down any words that came to mind (Becker & Leinenger, 2011). This optional task was 
designed to maintain participants’ focus during the mood-induction procedure. Participants in 
the video mood- induction group watched a 4-min clip of the scene about the death of Mufasa 
from the movie “The Lion King,” the same video clip used by Zhang et al. (2017b) to induce 
a negative mood. The music and the video were both played on a Surface Pro tablet, and the 
experimenter stayed in the room during mood induction. Immediately following the mood-
induction phase, participants watched the Little Girl Lost video and were then asked to 
provide a free-recall account of the video. 
Coding. The interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim. Participants 
received one point for each item of information correctly reported in free recall. For example, 
for the statement, “the little girl then saw a man with a small dog,” the participant would 
receive three points; one point for each of the people or objects involved (the little girl, man, 
small dog). Participants were credited for only the first time they mentioned an item. In 
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instances where participants changed their responses, only their last response was coded. 
Information from incomplete sentences was not coded.  
Results  
An independent t-test indicated that participants in the music mood-induction group 
reported a similar number of items from the Little Girl Lost video (M = 20.00, SE = 1.14) as 
did participants in the video mood-induction group (M = 22.40, SE = 1.96), t (8) = -1.06, p > 
.05. Given that showing two videos in a row did not impair participants’ free recall of the 
Little Girl Lost video, in the main experiment, we decided to use video clips to induce 





Participants. Participants included 225 University of Otago and Otago Polytechnic 
students (M age = 20.00 years, SD = 2.63, range = 18-48 years). The sample size was 
determined prior to data collection and was based on an a priori power analysis using G. 
Power 3.1 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007), which indicated that a sample of 225 
participants provided 85% power to detect a medium effect size of 0.25 (f) at an alpha level 
of .05. Participants were either recruited from the Department of Psychology’s Experimental 
Participation Pool and satisfied a small portion of their course assessment by completing a 
worksheet based on the experiment or through a Research Participation Pool and were 
reimbursed $20 for their participation. They had not participated in any similar studies 
before. Signed informed consent was obtained from all participants before the experiment 
began. The research was reviewed and approved by the University of Otago’s Human Ethics 
Committee, which is accredited by the New Zealand Health Research Council and whose 
guidelines are consistent with those of the American Psychological Association.  
Materials and Procedure. Each participant was tested individually in the laboratory 
over three sessions that were separated by approximately 24 hrs (see Figure 1). Participants 
were randomly assigned to one of three mood groups (positive, neutral, or negative; n = 75 
participants in each condition). Within each mood group, participants were randomly 
assigned to one of three question groups (neutral, leading, or misleading; n = 25 participants 
in each condition).  
 
Figure 1. Schematic of the experimental procedure. 
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In Session 1, participants were seated at a computer and were induced into their 
assigned mood using the same emotionally-valenced video clips that we used in the pilot 
studies; participants in the negative mood group watched the scene about the death of Mufasa 
from the movie “The Lion King;” participants in the positive mood group watched the scene 
where the characters sing Hakuna Matata from the movie “The Lion King;” and participants in 
the neutral mood group watched a National Geographic nature documentary about lions (see 
also Zhang et al., 2017a, b).  
Immediately after the video, participants were asked to rate the valence and arousal of 
their current mood state using the same Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM) that was used in 
Pilot Study 1. Participants were then asked to complete a short rating questionnaire about the 
suitability of the video for children. This questionnaire served as a distracter task to maintain 
the deception about the real purpose of the experiment and to prevent participants from 
rehearsing the details of the video during the 24-hr retention interval. Participants' responses 
to the rating questionnaire were not used in any subsequent analyses. Participants then 
watched the event video, Little Girl Lost. Immediately after the video, participants were 
asked the same questions about the video’s suitablity for children that they were asked after 
the mood induction video.  
Session 2 was the post-event information phase. In Session 2, participants were 
interviewed individually by an experimenter and asked a series of six specific questions about 
negative, positive, and neutral scenes of the video established in Pilot Study 1 (i.e., two 
questions for each valence). According to their assigned question group, participants were 
either asked six leading, six misleading, or six neutral questions. The leading questions 
contained information that was consistent with the content of the video (e.g., set in italics 
here: ‘What did the man in the silver car do when he saw the policeman coming?’). The 
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misleading questions contained information that was inconsistent with the content of the 
video (e.g., set in italics here: ‘What did the man in the red car do when he saw the 
policeman coming?’). The neutral questions contained no additional information about the 
target feature (e.g., ‘What did the man in the car do when he saw the policeman coming?’). 
For all participants, the questions were presented in the same order in which the critical 
events occurred during the video.  
In Session 3, participants were interviewed individually by the same experimenter 
who asked the questions in Session 2. The test was conducted in two phases. First, 
participants were asked to provide a free-recall account of the event video by describing the 
video in as much detail as possible. The only additional prompt given during the free-recall 
phase was, “Is there anything else you can remember that you haven’t already told me?” 
Once participants indicated that they could not recall any additional information, the 
experimenter asked them six specific questions about the video. These questions 
corresponded to the same features about which participants had received post-event 
information during Session 2, but referred to different aspects (e.g., ‘What colour car was the 
man who talked to Sally driving: white, red, or silver?’). Each question had three response 
options. One response option was the correct item in the video (i.e., silver), another response 
option was the misleading information presented during the post-event information session 
(i.e., red), and the final response option was unrelated to the video (e.g., white, termed a 
“foil”). At the conclusion of Session 3, participants were thanked and fully debriefed.  
Coding. The interviews conducted in Session 3 were audio recorded and transcribed 
verbatim.  
Free-recall phase. Participants received one point for each clause correctly reported 
in response to the general open-ended question. For example, for the statement “The child got 
distracted by the dog and just ran after it,” the participant would receive four points; one point 
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each for the child, the dog, got distracted, and ran after it. Participants were credited only for 
the first time that they mentioned an item. In instances where participants changed their 
responses, only their last response was coded. Participants’ free-recall accounts were also 
coded for errors, including the spontaneous production of the misleading information 
provided to participants in Session 2.  
Direct-questions phase. Recall that the participants were asked six questions during the 
direct-questions phase: two of the questions related to positive scenes in the video, two 
related to negative scenes, and two related to neutral scenes. Each question had three 
response options; one correct response (true memory) and two incorrect responses (false 
memory)--the misleading information provided to participants in the misleading group during 
the post-event information phase, or a foil. We coded participants’ responses to each question 
separately and then derived the proportion of correct responses, misleading responses, and 
foil responses as a function of scene valence (positive, negative, neutral). For example, for 
the two questions about the neutral scenes, if a participant selected two correct responses, 
then they received a score of 1.0 (2/2) for correct responses. If a participant selected one 
correct response and one misleading response, they received a score of 0.5 (1/2) for 
proportion of correct responses and a score of 0.5 (1/2) for proportion of misleading 
responses. Likewise, if a participant selected one correct response and one foil response, they 





Mood Manipulation Check 
Recall that participants’ level of emotional arousal and the valence of their mood were 
indexed by 9-point scales. Lower scores referred to higher arousal (excitement) and more 
positive valence (happiness). Two separate one-way ANOVAs across the three mood groups 
were conducted using the arousal scores and valence scores as dependent variables. There 
was no significant difference in participants’ arousal scores as a function of their mood-
induction group, F(2, 224) = .04, p = .96. Overall, participants in the negative (M = 5.44, SE 
= .20), positive (M = 5.41, SE = .20), and neutral (M = 5.36, SE = .20) mood groups had a 
similarly moderate level of emotional arousal. There was, however, a significant effect of 
mood induction on participants’ valence mood scores, F(2, 224) = 152.01, p < .001,  𝜂𝑝
2 =
 .58. The positive mood group reported being more happy (M = 2.44, SE = .17) than were the 
neutral mood group (M = 4.33, SE = .17) who in turn were more happy than were the 
negative mood group (M = 6.60, SE = .17). 
Data Analysis 
The data for each dependent variable was subjected to separate 3 (Participant Mood: 
negative, positive, and neutral) × 3 (Question Group: leading, misleading, control) × 3 (Scene 
Valence: negative, positive, and neutral) mixed factor ANOVAs with repeated measures over 
scene valence (Greenhouse-Geisser correction factor). Any significant effects were examined 
using the Bonferroni correction for pairwise-comparisons or Student-Newman-Kuels tests. 
Free Recall  
On average, participants reported 53 clauses during their free-recall accounts (SE = 
1.28). Participants in each question group reported similar amounts of information (neutral 
question group: M = 54.21, SE = 2.35; leading question group: M = 52.99, SE = 1.94; 
misleading question group: M = 53.25, SE = 2.35). In general, participants' free-recall 
 30 
accounts were highly accurate (M = .98, SE = .02), and the accuracy of participants’ free-
recall accounts did not vary as a function of their mood group or question group. Participants 
in the leading or the neutral group did not report any misleading information in their free 
recall accounts, however, 19 out of 75 participants in the misleading group spontaneously 
reported misleading information related to the negative scenes in the event.  
Direct Questions  
Following the free-recall phase of the test procedure, participants were asked a series 
of six specific questions.  
 Correct responses (true memory). There were main effects of question group, F(2, 
216) = 20.43, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .159, and scene valence, F(2, 432) = 99.62, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 =
.316, but no effect of mood, F(2, 216) = .321, p = .73, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .003. Participants in the leading 
group correctly answered a greater proportion of questions (M = .85, SE = .02) than did 
participants in the neutral group (M = .79, SE = .02) or in the misleading group (M = .69, SE 
= .02). Participants also correctly answered a greater proportion of questions about positive 
scenes in the event (M = .96, SE = .01) than they did about negative (M = .66, SE = .02) or 
neutral scenes in the event (M = .71, SE = .02).  
The simple effects described above were qualified by two significant interactions. 
First, there was a Question Group ×  Scene Valence interaction, F(4, 432) = 4.75, p =  
.001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .042. As shown in Figure 2, when asked about positive scenes in the event, the 
provision of misleading or leading information had virtually no impact on the proportion of 
correct responses. When asked about neutral or negative scenes in the event, on the other 
hand, the provision of leading information increased the proportion of questions answered 




Figure 2. Proportion of correct responses as a function of question group and scene valence. 
Error bars reflect standard errors of the means. 
Second, there was also a Mood × Scene Valence interaction, F(4, 432) = 2.64, p < 
.05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .024. As shown in Figure 3, participants correctly answered a greater proportion of 
questions about positive scenes in the event, regardless of mood. When participants were in a 
negative mood, however, they correctly answered a lower proportion of questions about the 
negative scenes (M = .61, SE = .04) compared to the neutral scenes (M = .73, SE = .03). In 
contrast, when participants were in a positive or a neutral mood, they correctly answered a 



































Figure 3. Proportion of correct responses as a function of participant mood and scene 
valence. Error bars reflect standard errors of the means. 
Incorrect responses (false memory). Recall that an incorrect response to the direct 
questions could result through one of two ways; one, incorrectly selecting the misleading 
information that was provided to participants in the misleading group during the post-event 
information phase, or two, incorrectly selecting a foil. 
Misleading information. There were main effects of question group, F(2, 216) = 
26.81, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .199, and of scene valence, F(2, 432) = 77.60, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .264, but 
no effect of mood, F(2, 216) = .102, p > .250. Although selection of the misleading response 
was relatively low, as expected, participants in the misleading group were significantly more 
likely to select the misleading response (M = .28, SE = .02) than were participants in the 
neutral (M = .16, SE = .02) or leading groups (M = .11, SE = .02). Participants also gave a 
significantly greater proportion of misleading responses about neutral (M = .26, SE = .02) or 
negative scenes (M = .25, SE = .02) than they did about positive scenes (M = .03, SE = .01). 
The simple effects described above were qualified by two significant interactions. 



































2 = .06. As shown in Figure 4, regardless of their question group assignment, 
participants very rarely selected the misleading response when asked questions about positive 
scenes in the event. For questions about the neutral and negative scenes, participants in the 
misleading group were more likely to select the misleading response compared to those in the 
neutral and leading groups.   
  
Figure 4. Proportion of misleading responses as a function of question group and scene 
valence. Error bars reflect standard errors of the means. 
Second, there was a significant Mood x Scene Valence interaction, F(4, 432) = 2.60, p 
< .05, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .024. As shown in Figure 5, regardless of their mood, participants very rarely 
selected the misleading response when asked questions about positive scenes in the event. 
Compared to participants in neutral or positive moods, participants in a negative mood were 
more likely to select the misleading response when asked questions about the negative scenes 
and compared to participants in neutral or negative moods, participants in a positive mood 






































Figure 5. Proportion of misleading responses as a function of mood and scene valence. Error 
bars reflect standard errors of the means. 
Foils. Overall, although participants very rarely selected the foil as their response, 
there was a main effect of scene valence, F(2, 432) = 20.24, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .086. Participants 
were more likely to select the foil when asked questions about negative scenes (M = .085, SE 
= .013) than when asked about neutral scenes (M = .038, SE = .009) or positive scenes (M = 






































The overarching goal of the present research was to examine the influence of 
emotional content of an event and participants’ mood on true and false memory for the event. 
In particular, we examined whether mood during encoding of an event that contained scenes 
differing in emotional valence, influenced true and false memory of that event. In addition, 
we also examined how the emotional content of the event interacted with participants’ mood 
during encoding to influence both true and false memory for that event. There were three 
main findings in the present experiment. In line with our first hypothesis, we found a 
misinformation effect; that is, participants in the misleading question group had the highest 
false recognition of misleading information, followed by those in the control group. 
Participants in the leading question group had the lowest false recognition of misleading 
information. In line with our second hypothesis, we found that false memory was higher for 
information pertaining to the negative scenes of the event than for information pertaining to 
the positive or neutral scenes of the event. Our third hypothesis contained multiple 
components; we predicted that mood during encoding would influence true and false 
memories for event scenes based on what know from the affect-as-information hypothesis, 
and SAT and FTT. Contrary to our predictions, we found that overall mood during encoding 
did not influence true or false memory of the event. 
 The basic finding of a misinformation effect is highly consistent with prior research 
(Loftus, 1992; for a review see Pickrell et al., 2016; or Wylie, Patihis, & McCuller, 2014). 
The misinformation effect is an extremely robust phenomenon (for a review, see Loftus, 
2005), and illustrates just how easily memories can be altered, raising major concerns about 
the reliability of memory. In the case of the present experiment, for example, participants 
frequently falsely recalled the colour of a car as red instead of silver, or recalled that a man 
was wearing a hat instead of glasses. As we had intended when determining the content of the 
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misinformation questions, the colour of a suspect’s car, and what the suspect was wearing, 
are pieces of information that when an eyewitness is reporting their account of a crime are 
likely to be vital to the investigation. In the real world, misinformation comes in many forms, 
for example, when witnesses to an event talk with one another, when they are interrogated 
with leading questions or suggestive techniques, or when they see media coverage of a crime 
(Loftus, 2005). Given how easy it is to create false memories for important details, the 
present study, when combined with prior research, illustrates how important it is to limit a 
witness’ exposure to additional misleading information, both inside and outside of the 
interview context.  
Many eyewitness memory situations involve negative and distressing events. In the 
present study, we found that false memory was higher for information pertaining to the 
negative scenes of the event than for information pertaining to the positive or neutral scenes 
of the event. This same effect has been well documented in the literature, in both DRM 
studies (Brainerd et al., 2008, 2010; Palmer & Dodson, 2009) and misinformation 
experiments (Otgaar, Candel & Merckelbach, 2008; Porter et al., 2003, 2010; Van Damme & 
Smet, 2014). Two main theoretical accounts have been proposed to explain the false memory 
findings of the DRM paradigm and the misinformation paradigm. According to Fuzzy-Trace 
Theory (FTT), higher false recognition for negative content occurs because the gist of 
negative content is easier to retrieve relative to that of positive or neutral content (Brainerd & 
Reyna, 2005). Alternatively, according to Associative Activation Theory (AAT), higher false 
recognition for negative content occurs because negative information has greater semantic 
relatedness compared to positive or neutral information so that the process of associative 
activation is easier for negative than for positive or neutral content (Howe et al., 2010).  
The finding that negative content increases susceptibility to false memory has 
important practical implications. Memory reports provided in the context of a courtroom or in 
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the context of psychotherapy are often emotionally-laden in their content, but the idea that 
memories for negative events may be more prone to distortion is not commonly recognised 
by the public (Kensinger & Corkin, 2003; Sharot, Delgado, & Phelps, 2004). In fact, as 
discussed by Laney and Loftus (2010) in their review of jurors’ perceptions of testimony, 
jurors tend to hold the belief that witnesses’ memories for negative events (crimes) are 
unusually accurate and resistant to distortion. In fact, some researchers have suggested that 
even judges and law enforcement personnel tend to not be aware of common memory biases 
and myths (Lacy & Stark, 2013). For example, Benton, Ross, Bradshaw, Thomas, and 
Bradshaw (2006) examined jurors, judges, and law enforcement professionals’ knowledge of 
factors affecting eyewitness accuracy. In Benton et al.’s study, participants completed a 30-
item survey in which they were asked to agree or disagree with statements about eyewitness 
issues. Participants’ responses were then compared to responses on the same survey from a 
sample of eyewitness experts. Benton and colleagues found that there was a large deficiency 
in knowledge of eyewitness memory amongst jurors, judges, and law enforcement personnel.  
Aside from the emotional content of an event, emotion can also be present as part of 
the context of an event (e.g., a person’s mood). Correspondingly, in our third hypothesis, we 
predicted that mood during encoding would influence true and false memories for event 
scenes based on what we know from the affect-as-information hypothesis, and SAT and FTT 
(see Table 1, p. 19). In particular, we hypothesised that positive moods would increase true 
memories for the information that was presented in both positive and non-positive scenes 
because positive moods facilitate heuristic processing. According to SAT, on the one hand, 
this increase in true memories might also lead to more false memories as well. On the other 
hand, according to FTT, the increase in true memories might lead to less false memory. We 
also predicted that negative moods, which are characterised by an item-specific processing 
mode, would increase true memories for the information that was presented in negative 
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scenes particularly compared to that in positive or neutral scenes. According to SAT, this 
increase might increase false memory for the unpresented-but-related information that 
pertains to negative scenes. Alternatively, according to FTT, the increase of true memory for 
the presented information pertaining to negative scenes might reduce false memories for the 
unpresented-but-related information that pertains to negative scenes.  
Contrary to our predictions, we found that mood during encoding of the event did not 
influence true or false memory of that event. The literature on how mood at the encoding 
influences false memory is mixed. In terms of DRM studies, some researchers have shown 
that negative moods at encoding reduce false memories, whereas positive moods at encoding 
increase false memories (e.g., Emery, Hess, & Elliot, 2012; Storbeck, 2013; Storbeck & 
Clore, 2005, 2011). This finding is typically considered to support the affect-as-information 
hypothesis (Schwarz & Clore, 1983) and FTT. According to the affect-as-information 
hypothesis, negative moods are assumed to facilitate item-specific processing, whereas 
positive moods are assumed to promote relational processing. Item-specific processing is 
similar to verbatim processing in FTT, which reduces false memory, while relational 
processing is similar to gist processing in FTT, which enhances false memory.  
Other researchers have failed to find an effect on mood at encoding on false memory 
in DRM studies (e.g., Corson & Verrier, 2007; Van Damme, 2013; Zhang et al., 2017a, 
2019). Researchers have proposed that the non-mood effect could be due to a property of the 
mood itself (i.e., the mood is not high in arousal). Regardless of the mixed DRM findings, in 
only a few studies to date have researchers used the misinformation paradigm to examine 
how mood influences memory. Forgas and colleagues (2005), for example, found that 
positive mood increased, and negative mood decreased, false memory of images. This effect 
occurred for both negative and positive images. The effect also occurred for real-life 
incidents, and even when the live event took place a week before mood induction. 
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Our findings are inconsistent with those of Forgas et al. (2005). This inconsistency 
could be due to one of at least three reasons. First, Forgas and colleagues did not measure 
participants’ arousal levels at the time of mood induction. In contrast, we strictly controlled 
for arousal when inducing participants into a mood state. It might be possible that the mood 
effect that Forgas et al. found was actually due to valence-arousal effects rather than a 
valence effect per se. In addition, researchers have recently argued that the significant mood 
effects are mainly due to mood’s arousal rather than its valence (for a review, see Bookbinder 
& Brainerd, 2016). For example, Corson and Verrier (2007) conducted a study in which they 
endeavoured to separate valence and arousal effects by creating five mood-induction groups: 
happy (positive/high-arousal), serene (positive/low-arousal), angry (negative/high-arousal), 
sad (negative/low-arousal), and neutral. They found that it was arousal, not valence, that 
influenced false memory; regardless of valence, false memory was lower in low-arousal 
conditions (serene, sad) than in high-arousal conditions (happy, angry). Therefore, one 
possible reason for why we did not observe a mood effect may be due to the fact that arousal 
levels across all three mood-induction groups were well controlled in the present experiment. 
Furthermore, prior research also suggests that neither mood’s arousal nor its valence 
influences memory performance, per se, but rather it may be mood’s valence that influences 
the confidence that people feel about their memory. For example, Van Damme and Seynaeve 
(2013) used a factorial manipulation of valence and arousal levels to create six mood states: 
four mood conditions, in which valence and arousal were varied, and two control conditions 
(neutral mood induction and no mood induction). Participants first watched a video of a 
tradesman snooping around an unoccupied home. Next, they were induced into one of the six 
mood states before being exposed to misleading information by means of a narrative. 
Participants’ memory was then tested with a recognition task, including confidence 
judgements. Van Damme and Seynaeve found that neither valence nor arousal affected false 
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recognition of misinformation. However, they did find that participants in a negative mood 
were more confident in all of their responses than were participants in a positive mood. In the 
present research, however, we did not measure participants’ confidence in their responses so 
we are not sure whether mood had an effect on confidence judgements.  
The second reason why our findings may differ from those of Forgas et al. (2005) is 
the different role of moods. As can be seen in Figure 6 below, in our research, participants 
were induced into a mood state directly prior to watching the video of the event, whereas in 
Forgas and colleagues’ study, participants were induced into a certain mood state after 
watching the event, but before being questioned about the event. In other words, we 
investigated the role of moods on encoding of the event, whereas Forgas et al. investigated 
the role of moods on encoding of misleading information.  
Figure 6. A schematic comparing our procedure to that used by Forgas et al. (2005).   
 
To the best of our knowledge, the present research is the first misinformation experiment 
to examine the effect of mood at encoding of the event on true and false memory. It is 
possible that being in a certain mood at the encoding stage influences memory processes in a 
different way to being in a certain mood at the post-event stage. Further research is needed to 
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explore these processes in more detail. Based on our results, we can tentatively conclude that 
mood at the encoding stage may not influence true or false memory of a witnessed event. 
However, further research is needed to replicate these results. 
The third possible reason for why we did not find an effect of mood on memory at the 
encoding stage could be due to the fact that the mood effect was too subtle to pick up in the 
present experiment. Even though our sample size was based on an a priori power analysis 
which indicated that 225 participants were sufficient to achieve a medium effect (0.25), it 
may be that there was a mood effect but it was less than 0.25 so we were not able to detect it 
in the present experiment.  
One potential limitation of the present experiment is that we did not measure mood at all 
stages of the experiment. The present research was conducted over three days. On the first 
day, participants were induced into a certain mood state and a mood assessment check was 
conducted, participants then watched a video of the event. On the second day, participants 
returned to the lab and received post-event information. Then, on the third day, participants 
took part in a memory test. We assumed that participants were in a neutral mood on the 
second and third day, however, without explicitly assessing this, we cannot be sure. To 
strictly look at how mood would influence the encoding of events, future research is needed 
to replicate the present experiment and conduct a mood assessment at all three of the stages 
of the experiment. 
Another interesting point to consider is that in the present research investigated the 
influence of mood by looking at positive, negative, and neutral mood states in general. 
However, there are many different types of moods that fall into the category of positive or 
negative moods. Take negative moods for example, states such as sadness, anxiety, anger, 
and guilt are all considered to fall within the category of negative moods. Researchers have 
shown that different negative moods (e.g., sadness and anger) have different effects on 
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cognitive processes such as social judgement (Bodenhausen, Sheppard, & Kramer, 1994) and 
decision making (Raghunathan & Pham, 1999). So far, in the field of mood and memory, 
researchers have generally focused on general mood states. Although Van Damme and 
Seynaeve (2013) have attempted to differentiate negative and positive mood states by altering 
valence and arousal (e.g., negative mood with low arousal = sad; negative mood with high 
arousal = angry), this line of research is just in its infancy. Future research should account for 
the more comprehensive nature of emotions by exploring specific positive or negative moods 
(e.g., anxiety or fear). 
Taken together, the research described in this thesis represents the first experiment to 
investigate the impact of mood during encoding of an event, and the impact of emotional 
content, on true and false memory using the misinformation paradigm. At this stage, we can 
conclude that false memory is higher for information pertaining to negative scenes of an 
event than for information pertaining to the positive or neutral scenes of an event. This 
finding has important implications in the context of the courtroom because memories in this 
situation are often emotionally-laden in their content. We can also tentatively conclude that 
mood at the encoding stage may not influence true or false memory of a witnessed event. 
Given that eyewitnesses may be in a particular mood when they witness an event, future 
research is needed to replicate these results as it is important to ensure we understand if an 
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Appendix B 
Post Event Information Questions 
 
Neutral: Sally saw the man walking a dog, what colour was the dog’s leash? 
Leading: Sally saw the man wearing a blue cap walking a dog, what colour was the dog’s 
leash? 
Misleading: Sally saw the man wearing a black cap walking a dog, what colour was the 
dog’s leash? 
Test: What colour cap was the man walking a dog wearing: black, blue, or white? 
 
Neutral: Where was Sally when she started following the dog? 
Leading: Sally started following the dog while her mum was talking to her friend, where was 
Sally when she started following the dog? 
Misleading: Sally started following the dog after her mum yelled at her, where was Sally 
when she started following the dog? 
Test: What was Sally’s mum doing before Sally started following the dog: talking to her 
friend, yelling at Sally, or on her cellphone? 
 
Neutral: What did the man in the car say when Sally told him that she had lost her Teddy? 
Leading: What did the man in the car wearing glasses say when Sally told him that she had 
lost her Teddy? 
Misleading:  What did the man in the car wearing a beany say when Sally told him that she 
had lost her Teddy? 
Test: What was the man in the car wearing when Sally told him that she had lost her Teddy: 
glasses, a beany, or headphones? 
 
Neutral: What did the man in the car do when he saw the policeman coming? 
Leading: What did the man in the silver car do when he saw the policeman coming? 
Misleading: What did the man in the red car do when he saw the policeman coming? 
Test: What colour car was the man who talked to Sally driving: white, red, or silver? 
 
Neutral: When Sally was at the police station, she was given a piggy toy. What colour was 
the toy? 
Leading: When Sally was at the police station, the policeman gave her a piggy toy. What 
colour was the toy? 
Misleading: When Sally was at the police station, Jess gave her a piggy toy. What colour 
was the toy? 
Test: When Sally was at the police station, who gave her the piggy toy: the policeman, Jess, 
or the receptionist? 
 
Neutral: Where was Sally reunited with her Mother? 
Leading: Sally’s Mother hugged her when they were reunited, where were they reunited? 
Misleading: Sally’s Mother cried when they were reunited, where were they reunited? 
Test: When Sally was reunited with her Mother, did Sally’s mother cry, hug Sally, or tell 
Sally off? 
 
 
 
